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Corporations as Victims of
Mismanagement: Beyond the
Shareholders vs. Managers Debate
Carlos G6mez-Jara Diez*
I. Introduction
In a much cited article from 1986, Professor John C. Coffee
analyzed the conflicting interests within the "corporate web"
when hostile takeovers soared in the 1980s. 1 In doing so, Coffee
discussed various theories of the firm that were dominant at the
time: the neoclassical, 2 the managerialist, 3 and the transaction
cost 4 models. The ultimate goal of Professor Coffee's article was
to highlight the need to take into account interests other than
those of the shareholders or managers. 5 In this paper, I try to
show that potential mismanagement cases 6 must also introduce
into the equation something beyond the shareholders vs. man-
agers dialectic and to make use of some new theories regarding
the nature of corporations. My point is quite simple and
* Associate Professor of Criminal Law (Universidad Aut6noma de Madrid,
Spain).
1. John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Cor-
porate Web, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1986) [hereinafter Coffee, Corporate Web]. See
also John C. Coffee, Jr., The Uncertain Case for Takeover Reform: An Essay on
Stockholders, Stakeholders and Bust-Ups, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 435, 444 (1988).
2. Coffee, Corporate Web, supra note 1, at 25.
3. Id. at 31.
4. Id. at 35.
5. Id. at 8, 13.
6. By using "mismanagement," in German, Untreue, and in Spanish, Adminis-
traci6n Desleal, I will encompass all cases in which a breach of fiduciary duty may
achieve criminal relevance. It is therefore not merely confined to the extended use
of the term "mismanagement" regarding the Employee Retirement Income Secur-
ity Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), the federal statute covering 401(k) plans, that was es-
tablished to protect employees from abuse by employers, or those acting on the
employer's behalf, by regulating fiduciaries' conduct and making them personally
liable for breaches of fiduciary duty. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1169 (2006). See also,
Kimberly Lynn Weiss, Note, Directors' Liability for Corporate Mismanagement of
401(k) Plans: Achieving the Goals of ERISA in Effectuating Retirement Security, 38
IND. L. REV. 817 (2005) (comprehensively analyzing fiduciary duties under
ERISA).
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straightforward: corporations should not be identified with ei-
ther managers, shareholders, or stakeholders, hence there is a
subtle and differentiated corporate interest that should be pro-
tected by criminal law.
In trying to achieve that goal I first refer to a line of reason-
ing: perception of corporations as offenders to be distinctively
punished without affecting shareholders or stakeholders. If cor-
porations, as the argument goes, are subject as such to criminal
liability, they ought to be criminally protected as such, regard-
less of shareholders' interests per se. Moreover, even if share-
holders consent to corporate damage, there is a need to closely
examine whether or not the distinct corporate interests are be-
ing affected in a way that requires criminal law action. This
implies fully recognizing a link between corporate personhood
and corporate victimhood, certainly expanding the scope of
criminal liability.
To be sure, though criticism exists, it is acknowledged that
corporations may be victims of fraud and, generally, of offenses
that do not require a certain "mental state" on the victim's part
in order to be self-evident. 7 It is far more complicated to find
corporations as victims of, for instance, threatening mail com-
munications or other mental-related offenses.8 Clear borderline
7. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 712A.30(1)(b) (West 2006) ("[V]ictim in-
cludes a sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, association, governmental
entity, or other legal entity that suffers direct physical or financial harm as a re-
sult of the commission of a juvenile offense.").
8. See United States v. Brownfield, 130 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1181 (C.D. Cal.
2001) (discussing the possibility of connecting the protection of 18 U.S.C. § 876, the
mailing of threatening communications, with the definition of "person" in The Dic-
tionary Act, 1 U.S.C. § 1, given that the victim of such threatening communica-
tions was the Federal Bureau of Investigation). The District Judge stated that "it
is well understood that corporations should be treated as natural persons for virtu-
ally all purposes of constitutional and statutory analysis. Even assuming this
treatment of corporations persists when courts apply criminal statutes to corpora-
tions as victims, corporations cannot be understood to have physical bodies. The
same nonsensical outcome results when the Court applies to section 876 the other
equivalents of "person" under section 1 which have not received the same status as
natural persons under the law as corporations, such as joint stock companies and
associations." Id. (citing Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653, 666 (1979)).
The problem remains in applying such interpretation to business corporations:
"Congress amended The Dictionary Act in 1948 and inserted a broader definition
of 'person' to include "corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships,
societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals," the same definition
that appears in section 1 today . . .Congress' broadening of the definition, yet
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol28/iss4/8
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examples are provided with the right to privacy or the right to
free speech-not to mention the escalating debate on "corporate
free speech"9-and the criminal law protection of such rights.'0
This paper deals, however, with a very specific perspective-
probably highly controversial-on the role of corporations as
victims: their distinct corporate interest in mismanagement
cases. The approach here is twofold. First, these cases imply
conflicting interests, and the corporate actor's interest is some-
times identified with either shareholders' or stakeholders'. Sec-
ond, these cases may affect third parties that not only demand
directors' and officers' criminal liability, but also corporate crim-
inal liability. Yet, this could imply being the victim and, addi-
tionally, being punished, which does not account properly for a
certain notion of justice.
The groundbreaking theory of the firm that will be used to
explain this distinct corporate interest to which the corporate
continuing to exclude the federal government, indicates that the federal govern-
ment is meant to be excluded from the definition of'person' in section 1." Id. (cit-
ing United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 275 (1947)
("Congress made express provision [in 1 U.S.C. § 1] for the term ['person'] to ex-
tend to partnerships and corporations . . .[and the] absence of any comparable
provision extending the term to sovereign governments implies that Congress did
not desire the term to extend to them.")). Thus, even if it is assumed that section 1
applies to section 876, the allegations of the indictment remain deficient because
the federal government is not a person within the meaning of section 1. See also
Lisa DiBartolomeo, Criminal Law - Government not Entitled to Restitution for
Sting Operations Under the Victim and Witness Protection Act - United States v.
Gibbens, 25 F.3d 28 (1st Cir. 1994), 29 SUFFOLK L. REV. 903 (1995) (analyzing how
the government does not qualify as a victim under the Victim and Witness Protec-
tion Act (VWPA) when it actively provokes the commission of a crime through a
sting operation).
9. See ROBERT L. KERR, THE CORPORATE FREE-SPEECH MOVEMENT: COGNITIVE
FEUDALISM AND THE ENDANGERED MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS (2008); Robert L. Kerr,
Subordinating the Economic to the Political: The Evolution of the Corporate Speech
Doctrine, 10 COMM. L. & POL'Y 63 (2005) [hereinafter Kerr, Subordinating].
10. Of course, a source of heated discussion is whether the ultimate goal of
that protection is to protect the individuals "behind" the corporation. For a Euro-
pean discussion, see HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS AND THE RESPONSIBILITY OF TRANS-
NATIONAL CORPORATIONS (Michael K. Addo ed., 1999) (especially Michael Addo's
contribution in which he relies on cases before the European Court of Human
Rights that have allowed corporations to bring claims for violations of rights, such
as the right to freedom of expression and the right to privacy, even to the extent
that the Court rejected a claim brought by shareholders alone as the corporation
itself was the real victim of the government's action). See also Alan J. Meese, Lim-
itations on Corporate Speech: Protection for Shareholders or Abridgement of Ex-
pression?, 2 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 305 (1993).
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actor is entitled is the so-called autopoietic (self-produced) the-
ory. According to this theory, corporations-at least those
reaching a certain degree of complexity-are not made up of
human beings or human actions, but of corporate decisions. In-
dividuals here are not part of the corporate system, but of the
environment of the corporate system. They basically provide
the energy for the on-going existence of the corporate system,
but are not part of it-just as the blood provides energy for the
consciousness system, but it is not actually a part of the system
of consciousness. To this extent, corporations develop a life of
their own that, as it will be argued, deserves certain protection
in modem society.'1
Part II of this essay will briefly examine the role of corpora-
tions as offenders and how organizational theory has shaped
corporate criminal liability. Here, corporate citizenship has im-
posed important duties on corporations, with the key word "cor-
porate compliance" reaching ever increasing levels of
responsibility. Would it not be feasible to require that citizen-
ship status also concedes greater rights to corporations, i.e., the
right to be protected by criminal law even though shareholders
or stakeholders consent to corporate damage?
Part III will then turn to some key issues of corporations as
victims in mismanagement cases. First, a description of the
main features of the autopoietic theory of firm will be provided.
The main theme will be the "emergence" of the corporate actor
as a distinct entity to which duties and rights are to be attrib-
uted. Second, an overview of different corporate interests per-
taining to the corporate actor will be conducted. "Corporate
survival," among other interests, represents an undubiously
central interest for corporations. Third, some examples of
11. Gunther Teubner, Enterprise Corporatism: New Industrial Policy and the
"Essence" of the Legal Person, 36 Am. J. COMp. L. 130, 136 (1988) (confronting the
concept of V. Gierke's reale Verbandspersonlichkeit: "[Ihf one abstracts from 'life'
and 'meaning' in the direction of a theory of 'self-reproducing systems,' then one
has found the criterion, with Gierke. The social substratum to be personified is not
simply a (static) social structure. Instead, it is an internal dynamics system, with
selections of its own, and with a capacity to self-organization and self-reproduc-
tion. All that Gierke had available to express this dynamism was the misleading
metaphor of 'life.' Today for this we have the cooler, remoter concept of an auto-
poietic social system: a system of actions/communications that reproduces itself by
constantly producing from the network of its elements new communications/ac-
tions as elements.").
[Vol. 28:795798
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harming these distinct corporate interests of the corporate actor
will be offered. "Corporate dismantlement" in takeovers with
shareholders' approval provides an excellent example for exam-
ining the consistency of the thesis set forth in this article. To
conclude, Part IV will try to espouse certain guidelines for fu-
ture consideration of these problematic cases that have yet to be
observed from this perspective.
II. Corporations as offenders
Since the landmark decision of New York Central & Hud-
son River Railroad Co. v. United States,12 the theory of corpo-
rate criminal liability for malfeasance crimes has been deeply
rooted in the American criminal law system. 13 To be sure, in
Hudson the U.S. Supreme Court employed a civil theory, i.e.,
vicarious liability, 14 to justify a criminal law institution. This
approach was based on efficiency and policy matters,' 5 and with
time it became more obvious that a solid theoretical body to
12. 212 U.S. 481 (1909). For an early discussion of the case, see George G.
Little, Punishment of Corporations - The Standard Oil Case, 3 U. ILL. L. REV. 447
(1909). The need for corporate criminal liability was then questioned over the fol-
lowing years. See, e.g., Canfield, Corporate Responsibility for Crime, 14 COLUM. L.
REV. 469 (1914); Frederic P. Lee, Corporate Criminal Liability, 28 COLUM. L. REV.
16 (1928).
13. A recent comprehensive exposition through the various stages of corporate
criminal law history is provided by WILLIAM S. LAUFER, CORPORATE BODIES AND
GUILTY MINDS 9-43 (2006). See also KATHLEEN F. BRICKEY, CORPORATE CRIMINAL
LIABILITY (2d ed. 1992); RICHARD GRUNER, CORPORATE CRIME AND SENTENCING
(1994) [hereinafter GRUNER, SENTENCING]; RICHARD GRUNER, CORPORATE CRIMINAL
LIABILITY AND PREVENTION (2005) [hereinafter GRUNER, PREVENTION]; LEONARD
ORLAND, CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY, REGULATION AND COMPLIANCE (2004).
14. The Court basically reasoned that the doctrine of respondeat superior in
tort law supplied the necessary ingredients for vicarious criminal liability: "Apply-
ing the principle governing civil liability, we go only a step farther in holding that
the act of the agent, while exercising the authority delegated to him to make rates
for transportation, may be controlled, in the interest of public policy, by imputing
his act to his employer and imposing penalties upon the corporation for which he is
acting in the premises." Hudson, 212 U.S. at 494.
15. For comments on Hudson, see Pamela Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard
For Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1095 (1991); William
S. Laufer, Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, and the Paradox of Compliance, 52
VAND. L. REV. 1343 (1999) [hereinafter Laufer, Corporate Liability]; William S.
Laufer, Culpability and the Sentencing of Corporations, 71 NEB. L. REV. 1049
(1992).
79920081
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support such institution was lacking.16 It took the courts, the
legislature, and the academic world seventy years to provide
the first justifications based not on individual actions, but on
the "essence" of the corporate actor. 17 As a result, the institu-
tion, despite constant criticism, achieved a previously unknown
degree of consistency.
These new trends in corporate criminal liability were fun-
damentally due to the insights of organizational theory.'8 As a
result, the corporation was no longer a collection of individuals,
but a complexity of synergetic interactions that could not be re-
duced to individual actions. Put differently, the corporate actor
is said to be not a mere addition of individuals, but something
separate from them. It is precisely in this distinctiveness of the
corporation where its culpability, its blameworthiness, dwells.
Therefore, concepts like "corporate policy," 19 "corporate ethos,"20
"corporate structure,"21 or "corporate culture" started playing a
key role in determining, at least at some stage of the proceed-
16. For an early harsh critique, see Gerhard O.W. Mueller, Mens Rea and the
Corporation: A Study of the Model Penal Code Position on Corporate Criminal Lia-
bility, 19 U. Pirr. L. REV. 21, 21 (1957) ("Many weeds have grown on the acre of
jurisprudence which has been allotted to the criminal law. Among these weeds is
... corporate criminal liability.... Nobody bred it, nobody cultivated it, nobody
planted it. It just grew."). For recent heavy criticism, see Jeffrey S. Parker, Doc-
trine for Destruction: The Case of Corporate Criminal Liability, 17 MANAGERIAL &
DECISION ECON. 381 (1996).
17. See Leonard Orland, Reflections on Corporate Crime: Law in Search of
Theory and Scholarship, 17 Am. CRiM. L. REV. 501 (1980).
18. The enactment of the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines clearly
showed the final decision to move away from the optimal penalties theory and into
organizational theory considerations. See LAUFER, supra note 13, at 33. In the
years prior to the passing of the Guidelines Jeffrey S. Parker held a strong advo-
cacy for the optimal penalties theory. See Jeffrey S. Parker, Criminal Sentencing
Policy for Organizations: The Unifying Approach of Optimal Penalties, 26 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 513 (1989); Jeffrey S. Parker & Raymond A. Atkins, Did the Corpo-
rate Criminal Sentencing Guidelines Matter?: Some Preliminary Empirical Obser-
vations, 42 J.L. & ECON. 423 (1999) (critiquing the efficiency of the Guidelines and
their organizational approach).
19. See Ann Foerschler, Corporate Criminal Intent: Toward a Better Under-
standing of Corporate Misconduct, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1287 (1990); Jennifer Moore,
Corporate Culpability Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 34 ARiz. L. REV.
743 (1992).
20. See Bucy, supra note 15.
21. See Peter A. French, Integrity, Intentions and Corporations, 34 AM. Bus.
L.J. 141 (1996).
800 [Vol. 28:795
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ings, 22 to what extent a corporation should actually be pun-
ished. In sum, a distinct entity arises and there is a need for
punishing its wrongdoings.
Codification of "corporate culpability" came with the enact-
ment of the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines in 199123 and
was decisive in the development of the aforementioned ap-
proaches. These concepts were obviously not isolated from a
broader debate taking place in the field of corporate law, i.e.,
the Corporate Governance debate, which, though consistent
since the groundbreaking work of Berle and Means in the
1930s,24 reached its peak in the 1980s and 1990s. 25 In these de-
cades, an unprecedented development of "Corporate Compli-
ance" took place and it resulted in a new concept, which would
dominate the coming years: the Good Citizen Corporation or
Corporate Citizenship. 26 According to this approach, corpora-
tions had to be law-abiding citizens and if they adequately com-
plied with the law by enacting "true" compliance programs 27-
not just "superficial" compliance programs 2 8-they would be re-
22. See, e.g., William S. Laufer, Corporate Culpability and the Limits of Law,
6 Bus. ETHICS. Q. 311 (1996) (pointing out that corporate (constructive) culpability
should be assessed during the guilt trial-phase and not only during the sentencing
trial-phase).
23. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5 (2004), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/2007guid/tabconchapt8.htm (coining the Culpability Score for
organizations). For the background and history of these Guidelines, see Ilene H.
Nagel & Winthrop M. Svenson, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Corpora-
tions: Their Development, Theoretical Underpinnings, and Some Thoughts about
their Future, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 205 (1993). See also Diana E. Murphy, The Federal
Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations: A Decade of Promoting Compliance and
Ethics, 87 IOWA L. REV. 697 (2002) (assessing the current situation).
24. ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDNER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1933).
25. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE.
ANALYSIS AND RECOMENDATIONS (1994) (the first tentative draft was released in
1982).
26. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEC-
OND SYMPOSIUM ON CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, CORPORATE
CRIME IN AMERICA: STRENGTHENING THE "GOOD CITIZEN" CORPORATION (1995),
available at http://www.ussc.gov/sympo/wcsympo.pdf. For a brief overview, see
Richard S. Gruner & Louis M. Brown, Organizational Justice: Recognizing and
Rewarding the Good Citizen Corporation, 21 J. CORP. L. 731 (1996).
27. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 8C2.5 (2004).
28. It has been contended that corporations are most interested in the cos-
metic appearance of compliance. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful" Mean
"Criminal"? Reflections on the Disappearing Tort / Crime Distinction in American
Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193 (1991); Laufer, Corporate Liability, supra note 15.
20081
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warded with a 95% reduction in the monetary penalty to be im-
posed upon them. 29
An interesting point in this late development, and one that
is important to the thesis of this article, is that corporate citi-
zenship started shifting from a strict economic perspective to a
stronger political significance. Just as the debate regarding cor-
porate free speech achieved new levels of political meaning,30
the possibility of a corporation expressing its views of society in
the public square, according to Lawrence Friedman,31 also ac-
counted for the possibility of suffering the imposition of a crimi-
nal sanction. By holding corporations criminally accountable as
citizens, it turns out to be a logical consequence to recognize the
possibility of protecting with criminal law their distinct corpo-
rate interest.
Certainly, if criminal liability is linked to the possibility of
expressing certain views in the public square, with state penal
sanctions being the reaction of the State against "improper"
views expressed through crimes, 32 then the opposite could also
hold true. That is, if corporations have a right to free speech,
and that surmounts to holding them criminally liable, should
their actions reflect a denial of basic community values-that
29. See GRUNER, SENTENCING, supra note 13.
30. See Kerr, Subordinating, supra note 9.
31. Lawrence Friedman, In Defense of Corporate Criminal Liability, 12 HARv.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 833, 846 (2000) ("A corporation thus can be considered as simi-
larly situated to an individual for purposes of the expressive rationale if it has a
discrete identity within a community and expressive potential-that is if ... a
corporation objectively can be viewed as having an identity apart from its owners,
managers, and employees to which expressive conduct can be ascribed.... The
modem corporation also can be substantively distinguished from its owners, man-
agers and employees by its capacity to express independent moral judgments in
the discourse of the public square, and so to participate in the process of creating
and defining social norms.").
32. This approach heavily relies on the expressive theories of (crime and) pun-
ishment. See generally Matthew Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical
Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363 (2000); Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H.
Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503
(2000). In the field of criminal law see Dan M. Kahan, Between Economics and
Sociology: The New Path of Deterrence, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2477 (1997); Dan M.
Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HA v. L. REV. 413 (1999); Dan M.
Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591 (1996). See
also Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime, 27 J.
LEGAL STUD. 609 (1998).
[Vol. 28:795802
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citizenship status linked to the First Amendment 33 should also
bear some fruits for the protections of their own, i.e., corporate
interests. 34 Otherwise, we would be holding them accountable
for actions that, if committed against them, would be regarded
as non-criminal. This could imply a considerable contradiction
in our approach to criminal law.
III. Corporations as victims
A. Autopoietic Theory of the Firm
The question then is how to identify that distinct entity
having corporate interests of its own? In order to address this
delicate issue, I will discuss one of the most complete, compre-
hensive, and also complex, social theories of the moment. Due
to time and space considerations, a full discussion of its ele-
ments cannot be outlined here.35 Yet, a description of the basic
features of a relatively small segment of said social theory, i.e.,
the one that only refers to corporate organizations, seems to be
feasible. In doing so, I will rely heavily on Gunther Teubner's
33. See Friedman, supra note 31, at 851-52 ("Though the corporation qua cor-
poration cannot vote, Bellotti validates its community identity by sanctioning cor-
porate contributions to 'what counts in democracy': discussion and debate about a
community's problems, fears and hopes, including determinations about that con-
duct which should be deemed laudable, and that conduct which should be con-
demned. Corporations, like individual members of a community, participate in the
process of creating and defining social norms, and in so doing distinguish them-
selves from those individuals.") (citing First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765 (1978)).
34. Most of the corporate citizenship movement is looking to add duties to the
corporate status, such as corporate compliance or corporate social responsibility.
Yet, duties must also imply rights. For the most part, those rights are generally
viewed as the factual dominant position corporations hold in our society. That,
however, is more a factual perspective than a legal perspective. Citizenship status
must also provide certain legal rights to corporations, one of them being to ac-
knowledge a corporate interest as an interest in itself that has to be protected by
criminal law.
35. See generally NiKLAs LuHMA N, ESSAYS ON SELF-REFERENCE (1990);
NIKLAs LuHMANN, OBSERVATIONS ON MODERNITY (William Whobrey trans., 1998);
NiKLAs LuHmANN, SOCIAL SYSTEMS (John Bednarz & Dirk Baecker trans., 1996);
NiKLAs LuHMANN, THEORIES OF DISTINCTION: REDESCRIBING THE DESCRIPTIONS OF
MODERNITY (William Rasch ed., 2002). For an outstanding introduction to this so-
cial theory, see WILLIAM RASCH, NIKLAs LuHmAN's MODERNITY: THE PARADOXES
OF DIFFERENTIATION (2000).
2008] 803
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work over the past 20 years. 36 In a nutshell, the basic reading
of organizations provided by Teubner unfolds as follows. 37
First, organizations do not consist of human individuals as
members, but of communications, more precisely of decisions as
their self-constituted elements.38 Second, organizations do
"think." It is through internal communication that they con-
struct social realities of their own, quite apart from the reality
constructions of their individual members. In short, organiza-
tions are epistemic subjects. Third, organizations are not per se
capable of collective action. They transform themselves into col-
lective actors by communicatively constituting their identity.39
Fourth, the capacity for collective action emerges when organi-
zations in their collective identity produce actions, and vice
versa, organizational action produces their collective identity.
Given that "an image is worth a thousand words," here is what
the aforementioned tenets are trying to convey:40
According to Teubner, in individualistic and contractualist
theories, a great deal is lost in the process of reducing corpora-
tions to a bundle of individuals or contracts.
36. See generally GUNTHER TEUBNER, LAw AS AN AuToPOIETIC SYSTEM (Zenon
Bankowski ed., Anne Bankowska & Ruth Adler trans., 1993) [hereinafter
TEUBNER, AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEM]; Gunther Teubner, Enterprise Corporatism: New
Industrial Policy and the "Essence" of the Legal Person, 36 AM. J. CoMP. L. 130
(1988); Gunther Teubner, How the Law Thinks: Toward a Constructivist Episte-
mology of Law, 23 LAw & Soc'y REV. 727 (1989) [hereinafter Teubner, How the
Law Thinks]; Gunther Teubner, Hypercycle in Law and Organization: The Rela-
tionship Between Self-Observation, Self-Constitution and Autopoiesis, in EURO-
PEAN YEARBOOK IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 43 (Alberto Febrajo ed., 1988)
[hereinafter Teubner, Hypercycle].
37. Teubner, How the Law Thinks, supra note 36, at 728-29.
38. Organizations are systems which compromise decisions and which them-
selves produce the decisions which compromise them. At the same time, they use
their self-organized structures in order to specify expectations which guarantee
that within the system every action can be treated as a decision. See TEUBNER,
AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEM, supra note 36 at 134.
39. The organization itself constitutes an independent, autonomous system of
action, reproducing itself not through contractual transactions, but through the
recursive linkage of organizational decisions. To this extent, the logic of the con-
tractual network is profoundly different from that of the decisional network. The
contractual network is concerned with motivation; the decisional network is ori-
ented towards organizational rationality - autopoietic reproduction and rationali-
zation strategies.
40. See Teubner, Hypercycle, supra note 36, at 51.
804 [Vol. 28:795
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[T]he "corporate actor," as opposed to the individual contractual
partners, as a new, different point of attribution for maximizing
profit and minimizing transaction costs; the criterion of "corpo-
rate interest" as an independent criterion for resolving conflict be-
tween resource-holders-this is something which amounts to
more than a mere balancing of interests against a background of
real or fictitious market mechanisms; the corporate actor as a new
contractual party for pooling resources; the collective binding ef-
fect of the corporate actor on the actions of the corporate agents;
and the effect of the corporate actor on the outside world, which
makes possible a new type of relationship between the firm and
its environment. 41
What can one expect then? It is the emergence of the corpo-
rate actor, whose social existence flies in the face of all method-
ological individualism, that leads the way for legal policy.42
41. TEUBNER, AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEM, supra note 36, at 130-31.
42. For a thorough use of the autopoietic theory of the firm to set the legal
policy for considering corporations as offenders, see CARLOs GOMEZ-JARA DIEZ, LA
2008] 805
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This path ahead lies in reinforcing the institutional position of
the corporate actor in order to make an impersonal context of
autonomous action. This shall impose effective constraints on
the range of action of individual participants in the interests of
the organization, defined in broad social terms. It is now time
to look more carefully at some corporate interests of the institu-
tional corporate actors, always bearing in mind that this is a
provisional (certainly not definitive) approach to the subject and
that criticism is more than welcome.
B. Corporate Interests Beyond Shareholders / Stakeholders
Interests
Assuming that the role of corporations as offenders might
exert some influence in their role as victims, and that the auto-
poietic theory of the firm provides firm moorings for speaking of
a real corporate actor, the question then is what kind of corpo-
rate interests exist for criminal law to protect beyond the inter-
ests of shareholders, managers or stakeholders? Certainly,
corporate law has always elucidated different forms for expres-
sing a kind of differentiated character for the "corporate inter-
est." For example, article 127.2 of the Spanish Corporations
Act 43 defines "corporate interest" as the "interest of the corpora-
tion", i.e., not the interest of the shareholders of the corporation.
Article 133 of the Spanish Corporations Act clearly states that
corporate directors' liability will not be excused by mere share-
holders' approval. 44 In a similar fashion, Section 76 of the Ger-
man Corporations Act 45 defines the corporate interest as the
"economic success" of the corporation, not the share or stake-
holders' success, together with other concomitant interests of
CULPABILIDAD PENAL DE LA EMPRESA (2005); CARLOS GOMEZ-JARA DIEZ, El Modelo
Constructivista de Autorresponsabilidad Penal Empresarial, in MODELOS DE
AUTORRESPONSABILIDAD PENAL EMPRESARIAL. PROPUESTAS GLOBALES CON-
TEMPORANEAS, 93-161 (2006).
43. Article 127.2 of the Corporations Act (R.D.L. 1989).
44. For a thorough discussion of the duties of corporate directors towards that
"corporate interest" in recent Spanish scholarship, especially regarding public
listed companies, see SANCHEZ CALERO, Los ADMINISTRADORES EN LAS SOCIEDADES
DE CAPITAL (2005); DfAz ECHEGARRAY, DEBERES Y RESPONSABILIDADES DE LOS ADMIN-
SITRADORES DE LAS SOCIEDADES DE CAPITAL (2004).
45. Aktiengesetz [AktG, Stock Corporation Act], Aug. 18, 2008, Federal Law
Gazette, Part I, No. 36, §76 (F.R.G.).
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the corporation. 46 And, to the same extent, mere approval of the
shareholders does not per se fence off directors' liability.47
The logic derived from identifying a real Corporate Actor
implies certain corporate interests that cannot be identified
with the interests of other persons. Moreover, as already
stated, those interests may conflict with the interests of share-
holders, stakeholders, or managers. Consequently, there is an-
other variation to be added to the traditional conflict-of-
interests-scheme between shareholders and directors,48 namely,
conflict of interests between the corporate actor and sharehold-
ers, stakeholders, or directors. The question then remains:
what to do with those conflicts between the interests of the cor-
porate actor and those of shareholders, stakeholders or direc-
tors? Of course, the problematic issue here is not so much when
corporate and shareholders' interests align against directors' in-
terests. 49 Problems fundamentally arise when shareholders
and directors align their own private interests against the inter-
ests of the corporate actor. In the remainder of Part III.B, I will
try to tackle some of the basic interests of the corporate actor.
In Part III.C I will proceed to examine some examples of collid-
ing situations.
Not surprisingly, the corporate actor's great interest should
be to "survive." "Corporate survival" is the interest of the corpo-
rate actor in remaining within the "society of organizations,"50
46. See Huffer, AktG, § 76 (6th ed.).
47. The issue is anything but uncontroversial. See Dierlmann, § 266,
Mtinchener Kommentar zum StGB 130-40 (2005); EDWARD SCHRAMM, UNTREUE UN
KONSENS 102-28, 132-44 (2006) (the opposing opinions of German Supreme Court
caselaw and scholarship).
48. There is no need to extend the analysis at this point, as it is an inherent
part of the agency problem and the separation between property and control. In a
way, the additional ingredient provided by the autopoietic theory would be to ques-
tion who is the principal and who is the agent. In this vein, instead of establishing
a principal/agent relationship between shareholders and directors, that relation-
ship should be established between corporate actors and directors. In this light, it
would be more problematic to examine the relationship, according to the agency
theory, between corporate actors and shareholders.
49. To be sure, there may be cases in which the alignment of corporate inter-
ests with either shareholders' or managers' interests gain substantial importance.
This alignment would strongly argue in favor of recognizing pre-eminence of one
over the other.
50. Charles Perrow, A Society of Organizations, 20 THEORY & Soc'y 725-62
(1991) ("I argue that the appearance of large organizations in the United States
makes organizations the key phenomenon of our time, and thus politics, social
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i.e., modem society. To the extent that modem society has
evolved from a "society of individuals" to a "society of organiza-
tions," permanence in such society may be regarded as a legiti-
mate interest of the corporate actor. Current legislation does
not foresee a right of the corporation to survive no-matter-what;
yet, dissolution or liquidation of a corporation is subject to cer-
tain substantive and procedural requirements. In fact, in bank-
ruptcy proceedings, courts may refuse to force liquidation, for
instance, when there is a request to convert a case to a Chapter
7 liquidation from a Chapter 11 reorganization. This implies an
interest in the on-going existence of the corporation and, al-
though this statement is subject to important limitations, it re-
flects the perception of a differentiated interest.51 Therefore,
and going back to the main concern, certain decisions made by
directors, in agreement with shareholders, to liquidate the cor-
poration may be regarded as mismanagement, so far as they
negatively affect corporate interests.
Apart from "corporate survival," there is also an interest of
the corporate actor in its financial well-being. "Corporate well-
being" could be regarded as another important interest of the
corporate actor. Surely, disposition of corporate assets always
implies a kind of harm to the corporation, but the same holds
true for individuals. The key issue here is to protect the corpo-
ration from "waste of corporate assets" approved by the com-
pany shareholders. "Corporate well-being" may collide with
class, economics, technology, religion, the family and even social psychology take
on the character of dependent variables."). See also CHARLES PERROW, ORGANIZING
CORPORATE AMERICA: WEALTH, POWER, AND THE ORIGINS OF CORPORATE CAPITALISM
(2002). In German scholarship, see the extensive analysis of Armin Nassehi, Die
Organisationen der Gesellschaft: Skizze einer Organisationssoziologie in gesesll-
schaftstheoretischer Absicht, in SOZIOLOGIE DER ORGANISATION 443 (Jutta Allmend-
inger & Thomas Hinz eds., 2002).
51. The debate regarding the "corporate death penalty" is surely of interest for
this discussion, as it is seen as the most extreme measure to be adopted against a
corporation and it is highly questioned in the academic world, especially after En-
ron. For basic terms of the debate, see Mary Kreiner Ramirez, The Science Fiction
of Corporate Criminal Liability: Containing the Machine Through the Corporate
Death Penalty, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 933 (2005); Assaf Hamdani & Alon Klement, Ab-
stract, Deterrence and the Corporate Death Penalty (October 20, 2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1024698.
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excessive executive compensation 52 and, regardless of share-
holders' approval, the pay-for-performance approach should
take into account the core of the service provided to the corpo-
rate actor himself.53
C. The Core of the Problem: Corporate Harm Despite
Shareholders' Approval
Throughout this article I have pointed out that the corpo-
rate actor may have certain interests that differ from those of
shareholders, or, for that matter, from those of other parties in-
volved. These different fields of analysis could be regarded as
potentially conflictive. These cases do not encompass all pos-
sibilities of conflicting interests with the corporate actor, much
less that these are the only ones in which criminal law has a
say. I have chosen them because they represent recent case law
in German jurisprudence that may shed some light on the con-
sequences of this type of approach. All of them are high-profile
cases regarded as hot topics in theory and practice.
Before considering these fields, and returning to the bare
criminal arena, it is important to note that those cases have
raised an important concern as to the relationship between mis-
management and the criminal institution of consent. Academic
and jurisprudential attention paid to this subject soared in the
1990s, and with the turn of the century it has definitely estab-
lished itself as a field of research. The possibility of affirming
the existence of a mismanagement case, despite approval of
each shareholder of the company, has not been easy to see.5 4
Once again, time and space preclude me from reviewing the va-
rious requirements for valid consent in the U.S. and other coun-
tries. Let me then refer to the brilliant and thorough analysis
52. To get an idea of current discussion, see generally the contributions con-
tained in ALFRED RAPPAPORT ET AL., HARVARD BusiNEss REVIEW ON COMPENSA-
TION (2002).
53. For an interesting perspective, see R. Glenn Hubbard, Abstract, Pay with-
out Performance: A Market Equilibrium Critique (December 2005), http://ssrn.coml
abstract=868513.
54. See EDWARD SCHRAMM, UNTREUE uND KONSENS (2005); JOSEF M.
WODICKA, DIE UNTREUE zuM NACHTEIL DER GMBH BEI VORHERIGER ZUSTIMMUNG
ALLER GESELLSCHAFTER (1993).
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of Vera Bergelson.5 5 To avoid too many references to the Ameri-
can scholar's literature, I only point out that the core of the sub-
ject-matter is that consent by shareholders would not be a right
to hurt oneself, but the right to hurt someone else, i.e., the cor-
porate actor, and that certainly the "objective meaning" to cause
harm should play a significant role.
Cutting to the chase, a perfectly illustrative conflict be-
tween a corporate actor's interest and everyone else's is a "bust-
up" takeover, a takeover motivated by the perceived disparity
between the target's liquidation and its stock market value.
The bidder makes clear that his sole purpose is to "sell" the cor-
poration in bits and pieces. In what could be termed as "corpo-
rate dismantlement," it is known to the shareholders that the
transaction will end with the corporation being dismantled by
new, or even old, management.5 6 To stick to the proposition, I
should make clear that the shareholders, directors, and stake-
holders would not suffer the consequences of such dismantle-
ment, assuming that shareholders would get a "big chunk of
money" for their shares, that directors would be rendered with a
golden parachute, and that no creditors would have debts
against the corporation. The problem is whether it would not be
considered mismanagement to dismantle a well-regarded and
correctly functioning corporation if that decision is only taken
on individual interests. This was, with certain nuances, the is-
sue in the Mannesmann case, which drew huge attention in the
German media and, subsequently, in German academia.
Though acquittal was rendered in the early stages of the pro-
ceedings, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed
prior opinions of lower courts.5 7 Once the proceedings restarted,
55. See Vera Bergelson, The Right to Be Hurt: Testing the Boundaries of Con-
sent, 75 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 165 (2007) (referencing numerous case law and trea-
tises). See also PETER WESTEN, THE LOGIC OF CONSENT: THE DIVERSITY AND
DECEPTIVENESS OF CONSENT AS A DEFENSE TO CRIMINAL CONDUCT (2004).
56. For an interesting perspective of the European discussion from a corpo-
rate law point of view, see Andrea Vicari, Conflicts of Interests of the Target Com-
pany's Directors and Shareholders in Leveraged Buy-Outs, 4 EUR. COMPANY FIN. L.
REV. 346 (2007).
57. The Supreme Court did not emphasize the essence of the corporate actor,
but stressed the need for directors to always act in the interests of the corporation
(Unternehmensinteresse). The fact that the directors rendered themselves impor-
tant appreciation awards that were not previously established, and contemplated
retirement benefits that made no sense for the corporation-though they had been
810 [Vol. 28:795
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol28/iss4/8
20081 CORPORATIONS AS VICTIMS 811
the defendants agreed to a nolo contendere plea with the prose-
cution, and the case was closed.
Another, even trickier, example comes in light of certain
cash management systems between parent and subsidiary com-
panies. To be sure, the law governing corporate groups is cer-
tainly problematic, 58 not only in the U.S., but to an even greater
extent in other countries. 59 The main characters in "private law
performance" are usually the majority shareholders in the par-
ent company and minority shareholders in the subsidiary.60
Yet, recent cases involve criminal law considerations. 61 In this
vein, it could be profitable for a parent company to assign major
losses to the subsidiary through the cash management system.
Sticking to the thesis, the subsidiary must have no debts with
creditors so that stakeholders are satisfied and that all manage-
ment could be transferred to the parent company in case of liq-
uidation. This type of case has raised serious concerns in
Germany and some managers have been convicted of misman-
agement for such maneuvers-it is the so-called "Corporate
approved by the majority shareholder of the (future) corporation-led the Supreme
Court to reverse the acquittal and to fix certain guidelines for the new trial court to
follow that would have ended up, no doubt, in conviction of all defendants. Regard-
ing the Mannesmann case, see BERND SCHt"NEMANN, ORGANUNTREUE: DAS MAN-
NESMANN-VERFAHREN AL EXEMPLAR? (2004); Martin Peltzer, Das Mannesmann-
Revisionsurteil aus der Sicht des Aktien- und allgemeinen Zivilrescht, 27 ZIP 205
(2005); Andreas Ransiek, Anerkennungsprdmien und Untreue - Das "Mannes-
mann" Urteil des BHG, NJW 814-16 (2006); Gerald Spindler, Vorstand-
svergitungen und Abfindungen auf dem aktien- und strafrechtlichen Prifstand -
Das Mannesmann-Urteil des BGH, ZIP 349 (2006).
58. For an old, though comprehensive, approach to the law of corporate
groups, see the various volumes of PHILIP BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE
GROUPS (2004).
59. For an updated discussion from a comparative perspective, see JANET
DINE, THE GOVERNANCE OF CORPORATE GROUPS (2006).
60. The leading authority in German corporate law is probably the Holzmuil-
ler doctrine. See Mark L6bbe, Corporate Groups: Competences of the Shareholders'
Meeting and Minority Protection, 5 GERMAN L.J. 1058 (2004). At its core, the
Holzmtller doctrine deals with the balance of power between the Hauptversam-
mlung (shareholders' meeting) and the Vorstand (board of directors) of a German
Aktiengesellschaft (AG - stock corporation) within the context of corporate groups.
Id.
61. The leading case is Bremen-Vulkan, in which the use of a cash manage-
ment system by a parent company that seriously damaged the capital equity of the
subsidiary was considered mismanagement and the directors of the parent com-
pany were convicted. See Andreas Ransiek, Untreue zum Nachteil einer
abhdngigen GmbH - "Bremer Vulkan": Besprechung des Urteils des BGH wistra
2004, 341, 24 wistra 121 (2005).
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Group Mismanagement" or "Konzernuntreue."62 This, occurring
in a country like Germany, which concedes less importance to
corporations than "Corporate America," suggests the strong po-
tential implications for the United States.
IV. Conclusion: Lessons to be learned for the current
corporate scandals involving mismanagement?
The perception of corporations as distinct offenders and vic-
tims brings new light to the approach taken by the Department
of Justice towards current corporate scandals. 63 Most of these
scandals involve mismanagement of large corporations that en-
ded up with extraordinary losses for investors, employees, and
even the general public. Enron, Worldcom, Adelphia Communi-
cations, Healthsouth, and Tyco, to name just a few, deal with
paradigmatic cases of mismanagement. There is certainly the
temptation of considering that some of these corporations, al-
though victims of mismanagement activities conducted by their
directors, also must be criminally charged. This could be termed
as corporate victim-perpetrator cases. 64
Social demands for punishment are there; but in a system
that fully recognizes the aforementioned principles, no criminal
sanctions should be imposed upon the corporation itself.65 It
would be just another victim of the fraudulent activities of the
Board of Directors or Senior Management. The governance of
62. Dirk Busch, KOZERNUNTREUE. EINE UNTERSUCHUNG SPEZIFISCHER UN-
TRELJESTRAFBARKEIT INNERHALB VON KONZERNVERBINDUNGEN MIT AKTIENGESELL-
SCHAFTEN uND GESELLSCHAFTEN MIT BESCHRANKTER HAFTUNG (2004).
63. When writing this article the operation "Malicious Mortgage" was
launched by the Department of Justice as a response to the credit crunch and the
subsequent write-offs of major financial entities that ended up with the rescue of
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac by the Federal Reserve. It will be interesting to see
if State Attorneys are going to be willing to charge not only specific individuals
within these corporations, but the corporations themselves. The negative impact
of such proceedings on the already aching U.S. economy will probably refrain them
from adopting such a position, though a speedy national economic recovery may
dramatically change the landscape.
64. See generally Alan C. Michaels, Fastow and Arthur Andersen: Some Re-
flections on Corporate Criminality, Victim Status, and Retribution, 1 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 551 (2004) (citing relevant case law).
65. See id. at 564 (using "negative retributivism" based arguments to affirm
that the victim status of the corporation ought to have an important normative
bearing on the charging decision regarding the corporation and moreover on corpo-
rate punishment itself).
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such individuals could no longer continue and therefore preven-
tive measures should be adopted. One "measure" to adopt
would be the immediate removal of the directors from their cur-
rent positions in the company. However, unless the amount of
the resulting financial harm due to directors and/or managers
mismanagement forces the filing of a Chapter 7 Bankruptcy
form, the corporation should still continue, and preventive mea-
sures should be removed once the corporation is back on the
right track. Being both a victim and perpetrator on the same
grounds does not seem feasible, when acknowledging the reality
of the corporate actor, or to put in Peter French's words, when
recognizing corporations as full fledged members of our moral
community. 66
66. PETER A. FRENCH, COLLECTIVE AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY (1984); PE-
TER A. FRENCH, JEFFREY NESTERUK & DAVID T. RISSER, CORPORATIONS IN THE
MORAL COMMUNITY (1992).
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